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Introduction 
As the Obama Administration makes the transition to a new course in American foreign policy, it 
is appropriate to look back to the last Administration to glean lessons from their recent experience 
dealing with the same international issues. Sadly, given America’s current low standing in the 
world and overstretched military, there are many lessons for the incoming Administration to 
observe. The issue is not just American exceptionalism, the policy of preemption or the use of 
force. What is most at issue is a lack of internal policy coherence that ends up making things 
worse, not better, and which has squandered opportunities for America to lead the world to a 
better place. The Bush policymakers, contrary to logic, went out of their way to drive opponents 
closer together, to drive our friends away and to have actions taken in one area make matters 
more troublesome in another. 
Iraq 
If, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 the Bush Administration defined the strategic 
context in which the United States was then operating as a worldwide threat from Islamic 
fundamentalist extremism, it made a peculiar decision to attack perhaps the one country in the 
entire Muslim world where such extreme religious fundamentalism was most in check. In so 
doing, the Bush Administration destabilized a region of the world that was already surrounded by 
too much dangerous instability. In one step Iraq, which had been a counterbalance to Iran, 
created a vacuum which invited increased influence inside Iraq by the Iranians (both competing 
Shia factions in Iraq have ties to Iran), while the Sunni areas became center stage for an 
insurgency. The invasion also created a vacuum which sucked in extremists from outside Iraq 
while unsettling Turkey, our NATO ally, which was concerned about the Kurds. With incredulity, 
the Bush Administration cited the fact that Iraq was the frontline of its "war on terrorism" as a 
justification for its invasion, when it only became such a battleground as a result of the invasion 
itself. 
Perhaps constrained by a worldview inbred from the Cold War, the Bush Administration seemed 
directed by the need to take action against a nation state, here Iraq, and a "war" on terror, rather 
than seeing that terrorism was and remains a very complex and extra-national response to a 
variety of factors—political and economic and cultural—and not susceptible to the "decisive" 
battle. Perhaps bound by a similar Cold War mindset of throw weights and comparative measures 
of conventional military power, the Administration failed to understand that such conventional 
power was inadequate and, in some cases, counterproductive to affecting the political situation 
on the ground. To use the phrase coined by General Rupert Smith, American actions lacked any 
"utility of force."[1] In landing as the triumphant warrior in military garb on the aircraft carrier 
Abraham Lincoln President Bush confirmed the view in the eyes of a billion Muslims that the 
United States had gone to Iraq as conqueror rather than liberator. The Administration seemed 
tone deaf to the opinions of those whose hearts and minds we wanted to win over and oblivious 
to the dictum that the purpose of military action is to win the peace. 
September 11 created an exceptional opportunity for President Bush to exhibit world leadership. 
There was an outpouring of goodwill for the United States by even those who customarily did not 
hold that view. There was a tremendous opportunity for the United States to forge an international 
consensus and to take meaningful actions to address terrorism, (both the threat and its causes), 
but the Administration very soon squandered that opportunity by its decision to unilaterally invade 
Iraq. The invasion took the focus off of terrorism (soon replaced by a neo-Wilsonian mission to 
spread democracy) which then not only undercut our actions to address terrorism but which drove 
respect for America and its moral leadership to the lowest levels in history. The period 
immediately following September 11 also provided the president with a unique opportunity to call 
for increased conservation and other efforts to lessen U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The Bush 
Administration, however, requested no sacrifice by the American people. Instead, President Bush 
became the first president to give a tax cut in a time of war, as he financed the war on credit while 
the American economy itself embarked on a credit binge. 
Whether one agrees with the Bush Doctrine or not, its application to Iraq was strange. From the 
outset, Pakistan was clearly the center of gravity in any meaningful action on terrorism. Pakistan, 
and not Iraq, was the country that most closely met the conditions outlined in the Bush Doctrine. 
The government of Pakistan was the main sponsor of the Taliban in Afghanistan under whose 
protection the September 11 attacks were launched. Pakistan, a non signatory of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, possessed nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them and was, in 
fact, a proliferator of nuclear technology. Pakistan had significant pockets of support and 
recruitment for militant extremist groups. In Pakistan a person like Mir Aimal Kansi, who had 
brazenly murdered employees outside CIA headquarters, found refuge in the immediate 
aftermath of the killings. President Bush could have organized a meaningful international coalition 
for action in Afghanistan, as his father had done with Iraq a decade earlier, and possibly for 
limited action within sanctuary areas in Pakistan tied to specific and limited objectives. Instead, 
the Bush Administration took its eye off the ball and drew resources away from Afghanistan and 
from the actual terrorist threat, consequently losing global support for military and non-military 
actions that would have been relevant to the actual threat to the United States. 
Nonproliferation 
The objective of halting the spread of nuclear weapons technology enjoys widespread support 
around the world. A treaty structure is in place to support that objective. Here again, the Bush 
Administration record is erratic. In his first State of the Union address following the September 11 
attacks, on January 29, 2002; President Bush proclaimed the infamous "axis of evil" in which he 
linked three totally unrelated countries into a single classification prompted by his simplistic view 
of the world, which divided everything into black and white. That shortly after the speech 
President Bush invaded one of the three "axis of evil countries" and changed its regime by force 
of arms was not lost on the other two "axis" countries. Not surprisingly, in response the other two 
countries, Iran and North Korea, seemed to have accelerated their nuclear programs as such 
weapons would be the only credible deterrent to possible American invasions. 
When, in 2003, Iran signaled a possible willingness to negotiate about weapons, it was rebuffed 
by the Administration.[2] This was one of the few times when the invasion of Iraq actually might 
have had some of the collateral benefit that the Administration had hoped to gain from the 
invasion, yet President Bush did not take advantage of it. The Bush Administration also took other 
actions that undermined the overall objective of non-proliferation and arms control. It unilaterally 
terminated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a signature treaty in arms control which then 
lead to Russian withdrawal from START II in response. It struck a major nuclear deal with India, 
itself one of just four countries that have not signed on to the Non-Proliferation regime (189 have 
signed). This latter act may serve to drive Pakistan somewhat closer to China, while part of the 
motivation of the deal with India was to counterbalance China in that region. All of these actions 
lack internal logic and coherence and often worked at cross purposes. 
Iran 
After the onset of military action in Afghanistan, the United States and Iran had extensive behind 
the scenes contact through which both countries cooperated to try to bring order as the Taliban, 
whom the Iranians also opposed, were defeated. Earlier, following the September 11 attacks, the 
then President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, had denounced the attacks and, on a subsequent 
trip to New York to address the United Nations, brought Iranian intelligence experts along in an 
attempt to assist the United States. His efforts were rebuffed. Early the following year Iran was 
horrified to see that after these conciliatory efforts Bush named Iran as one of the members of the 
"axis of evil." In 2003, the Iranians, in a message delivered through the Swiss Ambassador, 
proposed a "grand bargain" to the United States in which Iran would have supported the Saudi 
Arabian "Beirut Declaration" aimed at negotiating a comprehensive peace with Israel and also a 
cessation of Iran’s nuclear arms program. In return, Iran wanted to be removed from the U.S. list 
of terrorist states and to have the United States re-establish diplomatic relations, recognize Iran’s 
security interests and eschew regime change as a U.S. foreign policy objective with regard to Iran 
[3]. 
Again the Bush Administration rebuffed these gestures. No one can be naïve about Iran’s own 
record in supporting terrorism, but it is precisely with regimes that are unfriendly that moderation 
of policies and containment of potential threats is needed, not with friends. It is often stated that 
American policy seeks to encourage moderates inside Iran who will press for change. The United 
States may not have a better chance to work with a moderate than we had with President 
Khatami, a man who expressed a desire for a "dialogue among civilizations" and a willingness to 
work together to understand the root causes of terrorism. Instead, the United States now has to 
deal with President Ahmadinejad, a resurgent nuclear weapons program and an ascendant Iran 
which seeks to maximize its influence throughout the region, not least of which being influence in 
Iraq. 
Russia 
The collapse of the Soviet Union after five decades of resolute, bipartisan effort by the West 
created an historic opportunity for America to lead the world to a more secure future. Russia 
agreed to the peaceful reunification of Germany in the Two Plus Four agreement. The United 
States and Russia reached agreements on the reduction and control of nuclear arms. Russia was 
in the initial stages of a process aimed at democratization and the establishment of a market 
economy. Russia, along with the Western powers, formed the "Quartet", with the goal of finding a 
solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and bringing about a sustainable peace. Following the 
September 11 attacks, Russia participated in the Six plus Two talks aimed at bringing stability to 
Afghanistan (Iran was also a participant in those talks). Russia allowed overflight rights to assist 
in the allied effort in Afghanistan and it did not object when American bases to be used in the war 
in Afghanistan were set up in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—both former Soviet republics and allies 
of Russia. That same accommodation will again be essential for logistical support to supply the 
2009 surge of NATO forces in Afghanistan. Given their own concerns with Muslim separatist 
populations within their own borders, the Russians had a congruence of interest with the United 
States in terms of the threat from terrorism. 
Unfortunately, America did not appear to reciprocate this willingness to move from former 
adversary to participant in a new order. The United States during the Clinton Administration, 
motivated by humanitarian concerns, became involved in a bombing campaign directed against 
Serbia in order to protect Kosovo. Russian identification with the Serbs extended back until the 
time of the Tsars and this NATO action reverberated within Russian politics and probably 
contributed to the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia at about the same time. In 
addition, the expansion of NATO (which was initiated in the Clinton Administration) was 
accelerated by the Bush Administration. At the White House ceremony at which the latest seven 
former Eastern bloc countries were welcomed into NATO in 2004, President Bush stated with 
great satisfaction that there had been an increase in these nations’ defense budgets although it 
was unclear against whom this increased spending was to protect, since ostensibly the expansion 
of NATO so broadly was to reduce, not increase, military threats. The Bush Administration 
unilaterally abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and proceeded with the installation 
of missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and Poland, in spite of Russian statements that 
they saw these moves as threatening. Finally, in 2007, the United States recognized Kosovo 
when that breakaway region declared independence. 
Each of these moves was seen as threatening to the Russians and served to push them in the 
opposite direction of American interests—in fact from mutual interests—on arms control, 
addressing the global threat from terrorism and the elimination of the threat of war in Europe. The 
Russians viewed the ABM abrogation and installation of the missile defense shield as hostile acts 
and as departures from the spirit of progress on mutual arms reductions and the control of 
nuclear weapons. Similarly, they viewed the expansion of NATO right up to the borders of Russia 
as a threat to at least tacit understandings reached at the time of the Two Plus Two agreement. 
The sense of outrage was so strong that Mikhail Gorbachev, uncharacteristically and bitterly 
objected to the American position as reneging on promises made at the time of German 
reunification.[4] Finally, the recognition of Kosovo (yet to be emulated by most other countries) 
was seen as a slap in Russia’s face , given its historic relationship with the Serbs, and to a 
general understanding reached at the time of the 1999 bombing campaign to which the Russians 
tacitly acquiesced. 
At the time of the recognition of Kosovo, the Russians warned that they believed that there were 
analogous situations in the Caucuses (i.e. South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and intimated the right to 
similarly recognize those states should the situation arise. Although the Russians grossly 
overplayed their hand to their own detriment, when given the opportunity by Georgia, Russian 
actions last summer were not quite the black and white case of Russian aggression as presented 
in the recent American presidential campaign. The South Ossetians had declared independence 
from Georgia in 1991 and had Russian peace-keepers on the ground at the time of the military 
confrontation. The Russians viewed the Georgia incursion as having been encouraged by the 
United States and, to them, the provocative drive to bring Georgia into NATO. The Russians 
further complained that the United States’ denunciation of Russian recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia was a case of unfairly applying one set of rules to Kosovo and 
another to Georgia. (For the record, the majority of countries also have not recognized South 
Ossetian or Abekehian independence). 
Each of these actions has hurt the strategic interests of the United States. They are all examples 
actions taken in one field that have hurt American interests in another. The point of the Cold War 
was not to replace one type of tension with another or to fuel another type of military competition 
with the Russians. The objective of a peaceful and stable Europe could certainly be achieved by 
some type of a neutral status of most of the former Warsaw Pact countries instead of expansion 
of NATO up to the border of Russia. Taking actions that the Russians view as both humiliating 
and threatening and then reneging on understandings reached in a period of mutual cooperation 
does not promote peace and stability. One also can question the logic of tying NATO treaty 
obligations to volatile and ethnically charged regions of the former Eastern bloc. Did any of the 
neocons ever read the history of the First World War? All of these actions must have certainly 
dampened the Russian interest in further arms reductions (the START I treaty, which includes 
very important verification provisions, expires in 2009) and most certainly have undermined 
essential Russian cooperation in avoiding Iran from becoming a member of the nuclear club. 
Instead, we have a situation in which Russia and China are joined in the Shanghai Cooperative 
Organization (SCO) as somewhat of a counterbalance to NATO (Iran is trying to move from 
observer status to full member of SCO), and in which Russia has resumed strategic bomber 
flights and now intends to rebuild its blue water Navy. What has been accomplished by all of 
these actions except increased tensions, a nuclear Iran and the possibility of preemptive military 
action by Israel against Iran and the hell storm that would unleash? 
The Three Es 
A foreign policy should provide a coherent framework for the advancement of a nation’s interests. 
A coherent foreign policy should make a country more stable and secure. Unfortunately, the 
policies of the Bush Administration did neither. In a strange reversal of the old Roman precept of 
divide and conquer, the Bush foreign policy has united adversaries and divided friends. The Bush 
foreign policy violated what could be called the three Es: example, economy of force and 
economy. 
First, the foundation of American power in the world is the power of our example, of our moral 
leadership. That has obviously been weakened over the eight years that Bush was in office. 
Second, the Administration violated the military doctrine of economy of force. The Bush national 
security policy has overextended and then strained the U.S. military. It has asserted American 
interests throughout the globe while failing to understand the national security interests of other 
countries in their own backyards The Administration also failed to understand that our 
tremendous numerical strength in conventional and strategic warfare capabilities confers little in 
terms of power on the ground in volatile areas where conflict is carried out by insurgencies along 
age-old ethnic and tribal divisions. The Bush prescription seemed to jump too readily to military 
action before exhausting diplomacy. Even the hero of the final chapter of the Bush years, General 
David Petraeus, says "you have to talk to enemies" and used that as a bulwark of his 
counterinsurgency campaign [5]. 
Finally, there is the economy. It is the economy that drives innovation and enables funding for the 
various levers of national security projection. A healthy economy and economic freedom inspires 
much of the world. Unfortunately, the overextension of the United States in military action around 
the globe has cost the American taxpayer almost a trillion dollars in direct costs to date and 
possibly several fold that amount on the backs of taxpayers in future years. The use of those 
funds for that purpose rather than for education, science and technology, energy research, 
infrastructure and real homeland security has consequently made us weaker and more vulnerable 
in the years ahead as Dennis C. Blair, the new Director of National Intelligence confirmed in 
listing the collapse of the U.S. economy as the nation’s leading national security threat.[6] 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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